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DIRECTORS, MANAGEMENT, AND AUDITORS

Allies
in
Protecting
Shareholder
Interests

The Public Oversight Board,
an independent body
charged with overseeing and
monitoring the quality
control programs of public
accounting firms that audit
publicly held companies,
suggests steps to improve
the quality of financial
reporting.

W h y This R e p o rt is Being Issued

Since the Securities Acts of 1933 and
1934 established financial reporting
requirements for most publicly held
corporations, there have been periodic
efforts to improve the usefulness of
audited financial statements for sharehold
ers and other external users of financial
information. Currently, the Public Oversight
Board (POB), an independent body
charged with overseeing and monitoring
the quality control programs of public
accounting firms that audit publicly held
companies, is taking steps to further
improve the quality of financial reporting.
In 1994 the POB appointed an Advisory
Panel on Auditor Independence1to assess
criticisms about the professionalism of
independent auditors and consider steps
to better assure the integrity and
objectivity of their judgments about the
application of generally accepted
accounting principles. Particular attention
was directed to identifying steps to
improve the quality of financial reporting.
In accepting the Panel’s report,
Strengthening the Professionalism of the
Independent Auditor, the POB determined
that issues raised by the Panel merit
consideration by a broad audience of
corporate directors, chief executives, and
chief financial officers.
A major topic in the Panel’s report deals
with strengthening the relationship
between the board of directors and the
independent auditor to help directors meet
their governance responsibilities and

An active and effective board of directors, responsible financial
management, skeptical and independent auditors, and attentive
regulatory authorities all have responsibilities to safeguard those
who invest in public corporations. Effective corporate governance of

improve the quality of financial statements.
Of the Panel’s ten principal conclusions
five are related to that topic.
Corporate financial reports require
numerous judgments in applying generally
accepted accounting principles to reflect
the economic substance of transactions
and events and to determine the
underlying amounts reported in financial
statements. Many respondents to the
Panel’s inquiries observed that corporate
financial reports, while conforming to
generally accepted accounting principles,
do not always reflect the most appropriate
or useful presentation allowed by those
principles.
The central suggestion of the Panel is
that corporate boards and audit
committees should expect to receive
and independent auditors should
deliver forthright, candid, oral reports
in a timely manner on the quality—not
just acceptability—of a company’s
financial reporting. That quality
assessment should be based on
judgments about the appropriateness,
aggressiveness or conservatism of
selected or contemplated accounting
principles and estimates and judgments
about the clarity of disclosures.
By making that suggestion, the Panel’s
objective is not to narrow the range of
acceptable accounting practices but to
give directors a better basis for under
standing and influencing corporate
practices. The POB believes that if
corporate directors and audit committees
endorse the Panel’s suggested practices
and establish a supportive climate, the
result will be a low-cost, non-regulatory
step toward more credible financial
reporting.
The Executive Committee of the SEC
Practice Section2, with the encouragement
of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants Board of Directors, has

the financial reporting process is an important tool for enabling
companies and their auditors to fulfill those responsibilities.
Arthur Levitt
Chairman
Securities and Exchange Commission

1The Panel was chaired by Donald J. Kirk, corporate director and former Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board. The other members were George D. Anderson, former Chairman of the AICPA, and Ralph S. Saul, corporate
director and former Chairman and CEO of CIGNA Corporation. The Panel interviewed auditors, business executives,
attorneys, academics and government officials and reviewed written submissions and other related reports and studies.
2 The SEC Practice Section is an organization of over 1,250 CPA firms formed to improve the quality of practice of CPA
firms that audit public companies.

pledged active support for the Panel’s
suggestions. Recognizing that implemen
tation of the suggestions requires action by
all participants in the corporate gover
nance process, the Section has also
pledged to help other groups address the
recommendations directed to them. The
POB welcomes that support, and looks for
similar endorsements by those concerned
with corporate governance.
The remainder of this report explains
more fully the POB’s call for action and the
rationale for its recommendations to
financial managements, independent
auditors, and boards of directors and audit
committees.

A C o rp o ra te G overnance
A pproach to Im proved
Financial R eporting

The POB urges the board of directors to
play an active role in the financial reporting
process and for the auditing profession to
look to the board of directors — the
shareholders’ representative — as its
client. As the shareholders’ representative,
the board is accountable to them for
monitoring the company’s performance.
That accountability is discharged, in
part, by ensuring that shareholders receive
relevant and reliable financial information
about the company’s performance and
financial position. The board should expect

AUDIT COMMITTEES — A PIVOTAL ROLE, a Deloitte & Touche LLP publication,
describes the pitfalls of a compliance-based approach to financial reporting and the
benefits of a corporate governance approach.
The POB Advisory Panel is concerned, and Deloitte & Touche shares the concern, that if
no action is taken to adjust the course of current trends, we are destined to an ever more
highly regulated, compliance-based financial reporting environment in which professional
judgment takes a back seat.
One need only look at our tax laws and regulations to see the results of a totally
compliance-driven approach. It may appeal to some — an approach that enforces
discipline and precision through a myriad of rules. Management and auditors alike would
have rule books and checklists to counter the
hindsight of litigators and regulators. Auditors
Corporate governance in the United States is not working the way it should.
would have clearer lines to draw in addressing new
The problem is not the system of laws, regulations, and judicial decisions
or changed accounting principles, thereby
eliminating potential conflicts. There may even be
which are the framework of corporate governance. It is the failure by too
a higher tolerance for financial reporting failures
many boards of directors to make the system work the way it should. This
because people typically have lower expectations
state of affairs suggests clearly to us that more effective corporate governance
of an end product from a highly regulated process.

depends vitally on strengthening the role of the board of directors.

The regulated, compliance-based approach does,
however, have a serious flaw — its focus is on the
Partner, Wachtell, Lipton,
process rather than on the end product. Such a
Rosen & Katz
focus could result in less-relevant and less-reliable
financial information that would be of limited use
to all. And, it tends to force a one-size-fits-all solution to financial reporting, despite
differing circumstances and audiences.
Martin Lipton

In contrast to a highly regulated, compliance-based approach, a corporate governance
approach focuses on the needs of the users of the financial information and the quality of
the end product. Professional judgment is its center-piece and its strength. It is also what
gives this approach a fragile quality — dependent on the willingness of independent
auditors and corporate management to discuss with audit committees and outside
directors what is “ most appropriate,” rather than what is merely “acceptable.” Responsi
bility and accountability are the foundation for this approach — rules and regulations only
provide a framework for making the best professional judgments.

the auditor to assist it in meeting that
responsibility to the shareholders, and the
auditor should assume the obligation to do
so. This requires what is referred to herein
as a “corporate governance” approach to
financial reporting in contrast to a ruledriven, compliance-based approach. By
bringing the independent auditor into the
mainstream of corporate governance, an
auditor’s professional services will add
value and not be performed simply to meet
a regulatory requirement.
The POB believes that present
practices followed by well governed
corporations foster an environment where
the independent auditor, management,
audit committees and boards of directors
play interactive and timely roles in the
financial reporting process. This is
accomplished by both financial manage
ment and the external auditor discussing
important financial reporting issues with
the audit committee and, when needed,
the board of directors in a timely manner.
These existing practices need to be more
widely adopted and, in the view of the
POB, enhanced.

Responsibilities of M an agem ent

As partners in the financial reporting
process, each with a unique and possibly
different insight and perspective,
management, the independent auditor, and
the audit committee should exchange and
understand each other’s point of view in
reaching decisions that
affect shareholders’
interests.
As a director, it’s not the accounting issues that
To accomplish this,
are brought to my attention that worry me. It’s
financial management
the ones that I am not aware of. Expert assistance
should assume an
obligation to bring to the
is always obtainable. Clairvoyance is harder to
attention of both the
come by.
independent auditor
Paul Kolton
and audit committee
Corporate Director
the accounting
Former CEO, American Stock
implications of
Exchange
significant new
transactions and
policies while they are being contem
plated, not after the fact or after financial
information based on them has been
released publicly. This is critical to an
effective corporate governance approach
to financial reporting.

Candid discussion between manage
ment and the auditors will often lead to
complete agreement about the most
appropriate practices to recommend to the
audit committee, but will, in some cases,
define differing views of management and
the auditing firm. Differences of opinion are
healthy because they alert the audit
committee to the choices the corporation
has and the merits of alternative courses
of action. While management and the
auditor will find their judgments questioned
by the audit committee on occasion, that is
a small price to pay for enhanced
oversight of the financial reporting
process.

This report calls for the participants in the financial reporting process to take a
logical and necessary next step to improve corporate governance and the quality of
financial information provided to investors. The audit committee and board must
insist upon, and financial management and the auditor must deliver, their candid
views about the most appropriate accounting principles and estimates—not just their
acceptability—and the clarity o f the related disclosures o f financial information that
the company reports publicly.

—

Responsibilities o f the
Independent A u d ito r

The POB agrees with the Panel that it is
essential for the auditing profession to
bring greater clarity to the issue of who is
their client. The board of directors, as the
representative of the shareholders, should
be the client, not corporate management.
Corporate boards and audit committees
should make this clear to auditors.
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
the Supreme Court of the United States
concluded that the independent public
accountant “owes ultimate allegiance to
the corporation’s creditors and stockhold
ers, as well as to the investing public. This
‘public watchdog’ function demands that
the accountant maintain total indepen
dence from the client at all times and
requires complete fidelity to the public
trust.”
In most companies today, management
selects or recommends auditors and
changes in auditors, negotiates fees,
selects accounting principles, makes
estimates, prepares the financial
statements, and monitors the audit.
Clearly, a smooth working relationship
between auditor and management is
important, but there can be a downside.
Too close a relationship can discourage
the auditor from speaking up if the auditor
questions the accounting principles
selected, the clarity of disclosures, or the
estimates and judgments made by
management.
For years, auditing standards have
required the auditor to judge whether the
accounting principles selected by
management are “appropriate in the

circumstances.” The standard to which the
auditor has been held in making that
judgment has been whether the selected
principle falls within the range of
acceptable practice. The POB endorses
the Panel’s suggestion that the auditor
should now be held to a higher standard in
communicating with management and the
board of directors.
To accomplish
Audit is about governance; it derives from the Latin word
this, the auditor
should express his
meaning “ to hear,” it is about upholding the integrity of
or her views about
financial reporting and business conduct, it is about
the appropriate
seeking the truth. It is not about stifling the objectives of
ness, not just the
entities but constructively adding value to confidence in
acceptability, of the
those entities...Audit is about judgment, which in the final
accounting
analysis is personal; an expert view with personal
principles and
financial disclosure
accountability.
practices used or
The Audit Agenda
proposed to be
The Auditing Practices Board
adopted by the
United Kingdom
company and,
particularly, about
the degree of aggressiveness or
conservatism of its accounting principles
and underlying estimates and the
relevance and reliability of the resulting
information for investment, credit, and
similar decisions.
These communications should be
based on the auditor’s independent
evaluation of best financial reporting
practices applicable to the company’s
environment. Such financial reporting
practices should not be prescribed by new
professional standards. Such standards, if
they could be developed, would tend to
result in boilerplate language, which would
not be in the best interests of the auditor,
management, or the board of directors.

Responsibilities o f Boards of
D ire cto rs and A u d it
C o m m itte e s

Over the past decade, the influence of
management on the corporate governance
process has ebbed as boards of directors
have assumed the long-acknowledged but
only sometimes-practiced role as “the
fulcrum of accountability” in the corporate
governance system.
The trend in corporate governance is to
hold the board more accountable to
shareholders and management more
accountable to the board. Increased
oversight by directors and expansion of
the role of auditors in helping the board
exercise its responsibility will keep the
management-auditor relationship in
balance.
Boards of directors have a fiduciary
responsibility to shareholders and others
for reliable financial reports. To meet that
responsibility they should be aware of the
implications of alternative accounting
principles for reporting significant
transactions and events as well as the
aggressiveness or conservatism of
significant estimates. It is vital, therefore,
that audit committees function effectively
as the board’s primary contact with both
financial management and the indepen
dent auditor.
With the right atmosphere — the audit
committee recognizing its responsibilities
and auditors expanding theirs — the result
will be a forthright interchange of
professional views, thereby giving
directors a better basis for influencing
corporate reporting practices. In most

Directors must not wait passively for a crisis before they intervene.
Their job, even in the normal course of events, is an important one,
and they must have the necessary power to do it. Power, as we have
used the term, implies the time and knowledge, which not only
contribute to power but also allow its intelligent applications.
Jay W. Lorsch
Professor
Harvard Graduate School of
Business Administration

situations where management and
auditors differ on the appropriateness of
accounting treatments, the audit
committee can be a catalyst for all parties
to thoroughly discuss and understand
each other’s rationale. Most often this
should lead to agreement on what
accounting treatment is most appropriate.
However, if management and the auditor
do not reach agreement the audit
committee and the board need to be fully
informed and reach a judgment about what
accounting treatment is most appropriate
for public reporting to investors and others.
The independent auditor can add to the
effectiveness of the full board in monitoring
corporate performance on behalf of
shareholders—without detracting from the
roles of financial management and the
audit committee—by occasional
attendance at full board meetings when
the audit committee reports on its
activities. This may be particularly
appropriate when there are independent
directors who are not members of the audit
committee. It should also help provide a
basis for the board to recommend to the
shareholders the appointment of the
auditor or ratification of the board’s
selection of the auditor.
Legal Im plications

Many legal actions against directors have
alleged that the financial statements of
their companies in some fashion misled
investors. Some observers have
suggested the recommendations calling
for expanded discussions about the
appropriateness of accounting principles,
disclosures, and estimates will increase
the exposure of board members to
litigation.
The POB does not believe this will be a
likely outcome. First, the procedures
recommended will reduce the possibility
that the financial statements are in fact
misleading, thus reducing the danger of
finding directors at fault. Second, the
additional steps taken by board members
should be persuasive in convincing courts
and juries that the financial statements
were prepared with care and that every
measure was taken to avoid the
statements being misleading. In time, as
the increased care becomes apparent,
plaintiffs’ attorneys should be less willing
to undertake the risks involved in making
claims that financial statements were
faulty.

Conclusion
In summary, three steps are needed to further improve the credibility o f financial
reporting. ( 1) The board of directors must recognize the primacy o f its accountabil
ity to shareholders. ( 2 ) The auditor must look to the board o f directors as the
client. ( 3 ) The board, and its audit committee , must expect and the auditor must
deliver candid communication about the quality o f the company's financial
reporting. Ways for audit committees to implement these suggestions are set forth
below. Establishing a supportive climate for the resulting process to work effectively
is a task for all directors.

W h a t th e A u d it C o m m itte e
Should Do

The POB urges that audit committees
take action to ensure that their charter or
terms of reference include or provide for
the following:
■ An instruction to the independent
auditor that the board of directors, as
the shareholders’ representative, is the
auditor’s client.
■ An expectation that financial manage
ment and the independent auditor
perform a timely analysis of significant
financial reporting issues and practices.
■ An expectation that financial manage
ment and the independent auditor
discuss with the audit committee their
qualitative judgments about the
appropriateness, not just the
acceptability, of accounting
principles and financial disclosure
practices used or proposed to be
adopted by the company and,
particularly, about the degree of
aggressiveness or conservatism of its
accounting principles and underlying
estimates.
■ An opportunity for the independent
auditor to be available to the full board
of directors at least annually to help
provide a basis for the board to
recommend to shareholders the
appointment of the auditor or ratification
of the board’s selection of the auditor.
The audit committee discussion with the
independent auditor about the appropriate

ness of accounting principles and financial
disclosure practices should generally
include the following:
■ the auditor’s independent qualitative
judgments about the appropriateness,
not just the acceptability, of the
accounting principles and the clarity of
the financial disclosure practices used
or proposed to be adopted by the
company
■ the auditor’s views about whether
management’s choices of accounting
principles are conservative, moderate,
or extreme from the perspective of
income, asset, and liability recognition,
and whether those principles are
common practices or are minority
practices
■ the auditor’s reasoning in determining
the appropriateness of changes in
accounting principles and disclosure
practices
■ the auditor’s reasoning in determining
the appropriateness of the accounting
principles and disclosure practices
adopted by management for new
transactions or events
■ the auditor’s reasoning in accepting or
questioning significant estimates made
by management
■ the auditor’s views about how the
company’s choices of accounting
principles and disclosure practices may
affect shareholders and public views
and attitudes about the company.

Copies of the report of the Advisory Panel on
Auditor Independence Strengthening the
Professionalism of the Independent Auditor, or
additional copies of this report, can be obtained
by contacting the Public Oversight Board’s
offices.

Public O versight Board
One Station Place, Stamford, CT 06902
(203) 353-5300
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